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I. INTRODUCTION

Globalization has made the world smaller and more homogeneous in
terms of both culture and government policy.' A recent example of this
convergence is the common policy response by the United States and South

* This Article was previously published in the FloridaLaw Review, September 2001.
I. BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD Vs. MCWORLD 4-5 (1995) (describing tendencies towards
homogenization in the global economy); ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 3-5 (1998) (describing
cultural homogenization through the proliferation of brand names and trademarks).
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African governments to a shared problem.2 The problem is the high price
of pharmaceutical products. The policy response is the creation of gray
markets, or reimportation (or parallel importation) of patented products
from overseas markets to create competition in the domestic
pharmaceutical market. Although, ostensibly, the policy responses are the
same, there are important differences which present an important case study
of the relationships among patents, human rights, and competition.
The problem posed by the high price of pharmaceuticals is a familiar
one The proposed solution of creating gray markets is less familiar. A gray
market is an unauthorized distribution of a good or service.4 It is different
from a black market, which involves the distribution of a product or service
that is illegal to distribute, such as cocaine or sexual services. In a gray
market, the product or service itself is not illegal, but the means of
distribution are unauthorized. The classic example ofthe gray market is the
group of small retail outlets selling electronic goods on 42nd Street in New
York City and in Chinatown of San Francisco. These outlets sell electronic
products that are not illegal to sell in the United States, but the outlets are
not authorized by the manufacturer. The retailers obtain the products
overseas where they are sold at a price lower than that prevailing in the
United States. Because of the price difference, it is profitable to purchase
the goods overseas, transport them to the United States, and sell them here.
The question raised by gray marketers is whether their lack of
authorization should imply illegality or should the state authorize gray
markets and take affirmative steps to foster their development. In the
electronic outlets example, the manufacturer typically designates certain
authorized dealers through contracts. Contracts limit the number of dealers
in a particular geographic market and may also limit the types of customers
to whom the goods may be sold. The gray marketers for electronic
products have, of course, not breached any contract terms since they are

2. 146 CONG. REC. D 776-216 (daily ed. July 19,2000) (amending the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act to allow importation of covered products); Consumer Project on Technology,
South Africa and Access to Pharmaceutical Drugs, available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa
(last visited Apr. 9, 2001) (collecting materials on the debate and experience of South Africa).
3. For journalistic accounts, see Stephen S. Hall, The Claritin Effect: Prescriptionfor
Profit, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. !1, 2001, § 6 (Magazine), at 40-43 (reviewing the problem of
prescription drug prices in the United States); Tina Rosenberg, Look at Brazil, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
28,2001, § 6 (Magazine), at 26-28 (reviewing pharmaceuticals in the AIDS crisis). For a technical
discussion of the costs of drug development, see Michael Kremer, Creating Markets for New
Vaccines 35-38 (May 12, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
4. Nancy T. Gallini & Aidan Hollis, A ContractualApproachto the GrayMarket, 19 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 1, 3-7 (1999); Shubha Ghosh, An Economic Analysis of the Common Control
Exception to GrayMarket Exclusion, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 373, 375-85 (1994).
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not in privity with the manufacturer. The authorized dealers very likely have
not breached any terms of the contract with the manufacturer since the
authorized dealer has not sold outside the territory designated in the
contract. Furthermore, any customer restrictions in the contract most likely
have not been violated, unless the authorized dealer knew that he was
selling to a gray marketer. Contract law would not serve as a basis for
challenging the legality of gray marketing.5
However, intellectual property law would provide a basis for legal
challenge and has been the body of law used in legal claims against gray
marketing. When the gray market products or services are branded, the
trademark owner may have a strong claim of trademark infringement
against the gray marketer, especially if there may be consumer confusion as
to whether the manufacturer endorses the gray market sale.6 Furthermore,
the packaging of the product and the product itself, for example books and
songs, may be copyrighted.7 Distribution of products protected by
copyright would constitute copyright infringement. Finally, U.S. patent law
gives the patent owner the exclusive right to make, use, and sell the
patented item within the United States and to enjoin the importation of the
patented item into the United States from overseas If the gray market
product or service incorporates patented items or is itself patented, then
patent law would serve as a means to prevent the gray market.
However, there are very important limits within intellectual property
that would protect gray markets. Under trademark law, the plaintiff must

5. Even though lack of privity limits the efficacy of contract law in regulating the gray
market, a combination of contract, tort, and antitrust laws could prove effective. See Gallini &
Hollis, supra note 4, at 18-19.
6. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 285-95 (1988) (discussing the role of
the U.S. Customs Office and corporate control in the gray market); Lever Bros. Co. v. United
States, 981 F. 2d 1330, 1338-39 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (discussing the role of consumer confusion and
material difference).
7. Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'Anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 152-54 (1998)
(holding that the first sale doctrine limits copyright claims against gray marketers regardless of
where the sale occurred when gray market goods originated in the United States); see also BMG
Music v. Perez, 952 F. 2d 318, 319-20 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the first sale doctrine does
not apply when gray market goods originated overseas).
8. "The applicant, patentee, or his assigns or legal representatives may in like manner grant
and convey an exclusive right under his application for patent, or patents, to the whole or any
specified part of the United States." 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994). This provision has been read to
prevent contractual import bans of patented items into the United States. Becton, Dickinson & Co.
v. Eisele & Co., 86 F. 2d 267, 269-70 (6th Cir. 1936). For a discussion of patent law and parallel
importation in the United States, see COMPETITION POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 408-11 (Robert D. Anderson & Nancy T. Gallini eds.,
1998).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

3

JOURNAL OF
INTERNA77ONAL
Florida Journal ofFLORIDA
International
Law,
Vol. 14, Iss. LAW
2 [2002], Art. 4

[Vol. 14

show that there is a likelihood of confusion as to the source of the product.
The classic trademark case is when a manufacturer makes a product and
affixes a competitor's brand to the product, making it seem that the
competitor produced it. Gray marketing is very different from the classic
case. The gray market goods were manufactured by the trademark owner.
The manufacturer distributed the product overseas through authorized
channels in which they were purchased and later resold in the United States
through unauthorized channels. Consequently, there cannot be any
consumer confusion or deception as to the source of the product. The main
qualification to this limitation is that if the products and services distributed
in the foreign market are of a lower or different quality than similarly
branded products in the United States, then the trademark owner would
have a cause of action against the gray marketer for trademark
infringement.9
Copyright law has similar limitations. If the gray marketer bought the
product or service overseas from an authorized dealer and redistributed it
within the United States and the product or service was legally created
under U.S. copyright law, then the gray marketer would be protected from
violating the copyright owner's right of exclusive distribution within the
United States under the first sale doctrine."l Under this doctrine, a
copyright owner cannot prevent the distribution of a copyrighted work after
the owner has made the first sale of the work. The doctrine is an example
of the broader principle of the exhaustion of rights, which applies
potentially to all intellectual property rights. In the area of trademark law,
the principle of exhaustion will limit the ability of the trademark owner to
prohibit sales of the branded item after the item has been sold in the
geographic market where the trademark is recognized.
The principle of exhaustion, and its specific application in the first sale
doctrine, has been applied in two very important and recent gray market
cases. In the United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the first sale
doctrine barred a claim of copyright infringement against a gray marketer
when the product was lawfully made under U.S. copyright law. I" In the
European Community, the European Court of Justice held that the
manufacturer of trademarked sunglasses could prohibit the sale in Austria

9. See K Mart, 486 U.S. at 293; see also Lever Bros., 981 F. 2d at 1338 (stating that
"common control exception" upheld in K Mart does not apply when gray market goods are
"physically, materially different" from goods distributed in the United States with the same
trademark).
10. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a)(1994).
11. See Quality King, 523 U.S. at 147.
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2
of gray market sunglasses that were obtained from a dealer in Bulgaria.
The sale to the dealer in Bulgaria could not exhaust the trademark owner's
rights because the trademark was not registered in Bulgaria. 3 Therefore,4
the trademark owner had not exhausted any economic rights in the brand. '
Patent law offers the strongest protection against the gray market
because it escapes the limitations noted for trademark and copyright
protection. If the gray marketed product is patented, then, under the law of
all jurisdictions, the patent owner has the right to exclude all imports and
the exclusive right to distribute within the geographic boundaries of the
patent jurisdiction. Because of this strong protection, the patent owner
obtains strong rights to produce and market the patented item within each
geographic market in which she has a patent."5 Gray markets in the United
States are extremely rare when patent law comes into play. However, gray
markets are quite active in the European Union, particularly for
pharmaceuticals. 6 The European Court of Justice has held that the sale of
a patented pharmaceutical anywhere in the European Union, even in a
jurisdiction where the patent is not registered, exhausts the rights of the
patent owner.
With this background, we can now consider the pharmaceutical
industry. The high prices charged for patented drugs reflect the strong
protection accorded by patent law. The protection of patent law is
enhanced by trademark law, which is used to obtain proprietary rights in the
shape and color of the pills, even after the patent has expired. In South
Africa, a market has developed to provide low cost alternatives for
patented AIDS drugs through both generic manufacturers, which produce
in violation of South African patent law, and through gray marketers, who
import patented drugs from India into South Africa. Both activities have
been challenged by Western pharmaceutical firms in a recent lawsuit filed
against the South African government in a South African court.' 7 In the

12. Case C-355/96, Silhouette Int'l Schmied v. Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft, 1998 E.C.R.
1-4799.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. The principle of exhaustion has been applied to permit the importation of gray market
goods that are patent-infringing when the goods have been distributed without an express
contractual restriction in the contract of sale or license. Dickerson v. Matheson, 57 F. 524, 527
(2d Cir. 1893); Holiday v. Mattheson, 24 F. 185, 185-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1885).
16. Joined Cases C-267/95 & C-268/95, Merck & Co. v. Primecrown, Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. I6285; Merck & Co. v. Stephar BV, 1981 E.C.R. 2063.
17. Pharm. Mfrs. Ass'n v. President of the Republic of S. Aft., No. 4183/98 (Transvaal
Provincial Div., filed Feb. 18, 1998), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/pharma
suit.html.
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United States, Congress passed legislation in October 2000, as part of a
general appropriation bill for agriculture, that authorized the reimportation
of patented pharmaceutical products from Canada into the United States,
subject to approval from the Department of Health and Human Services.' 8
Then Secretary of Health and Human Services, Donna Shalala, refused to
authorize such reimports for fear that the gray market pharmaceuticals
would not meet U.S. safety standards. 9 Both her decision and its support
by President Clinton were controversial, especially in light of the
pharmaceutical firms' support for the President's earlier campaign. Current
Secretary of Health and Human Services, Tommy Thompson, is
reconsidering the measure. 20 In both instances, we see the use of the gray
market to limit and regulate the rights of patent owners.
What is even more interesting about these policies is that the gray
market is being commandeered to address what is essentially a human rights
issue. 21 Professor Rosemary Coombe has addressed how human rights and
economic rights merge in the regulation of culture, particularly with the
issue of intellectual property protection for indigenous knowledge and
folklore.22 In her examples, the recognition of intellectual property rights in
indigenous knowledge can further the human rights goals of cultural and
identity protection.23 With respect to the case of the pharmaceutical
industry, human rights and intellectual property rights are in seemingly
irreconcilable conflict. Through high prices, patent owners are denying
18. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 106-948, at 39 (2001) ("Making Appropriations for Agriculture
Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Programs for the Fiscal
Year Ending Sept. 30, 2001, and for Other Purposes," amending 21 U.S.C. § 381).
19. Marc Kaufman, Shalala Halts Bid to Lower Drug Costs; Reimportation Bill's 'Fatal
Flaws' Cited, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 2000, at Al; Robert Pear, In a Turnaround,White House

Kills Drug-Import Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2000, at Al; Alissa J. Rubin, Plan Droppedto
Reimport US. Made Medications,L.A. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2000, at Al.
20. Hearing on the Nomination of Tommy Thompson to be Sec 'y of Health and Human

Services Before the Senate Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor,andPensions,107th Cong. 59 (200 1).
Transcripts of Thompson's testimony, available at http://www.kaisemetwork.org/health-cast/
uploaded _files/day_2_Transcriptof gov.pdf (last visited May 30, 2001).
21. For a discussion of the complexity of the meaning of human rights, see Makau Mutua,
Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 201, 207,

244 (2001) (critiquing the notion of human rights law as a tool for saving savages and victims by
imposing a Western notion of the good society as opposed to recognizing a "construction of a
human rights movement that wins for all"). A discussion of the universal appeal of the U.N.
Declaration of Human Rights can be found in MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW:
ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 232-33 (2001).
22. Rosemary J. Coombe, Intellectual Property, Human Rights and Sovereignty: New
Dilemmas in InternationalLaw Posed by the Recognition of Indigenous Knowledge and the
Conservation ofBiodiversity, 6 IND. J.GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 59, 61-62 (1998).

23. ld.at80-81.
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access to life-saving or pain-reducing drugs. Since patent owners are
granted a very strong, if not absolute, right to exclude, the only way to
grant access to the drugs is by limiting the rights of the patent owners.
Sovereigns, since they grant initial patent rights, could in theory limit the
rights of patent owners under some more salient principle. In fact, the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) allows signatory nations to limit intellectual property rights in the
case of emergency or life-threatening situations. 24 However, TRIPS also
imposes procedures that must be followed in these situations. 25 The
creation of a gray market seems to provide an ingenious way to use the
market to create competition and resolve pressing human rights issues.
The question, of course, is whether allowing gray markets for
pharmaceuticals is effective. I address this question in this Article and
conclude that while the gray market solution is appropriate in South Africa,
its effectiveness, as proposed, is questionable in the United States. While
ideally it would be more appropriate to address the problems directly as
human rights matters,26 the solution of creating gray markets may be the
most effective within the constraints ofthe current legal system. However,
the gray market must be created in a suitable and rational fashion. I develop
these points as follows. Part II presents an overview of the economics of
intellectual property and gray markets, focusing specifically on the fixed
cost and the public goods problems. Part III addresses the United States
and South Africa's experiences with pharmaceuticals and assesses the gray

24. "Members may, in formulating or amending their national laws and regulations, adopt
measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in
sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development, provided that
such measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement." Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establish the World
Trade Organization, Annex IC, art. 8, 1, LEGAL INSTRUMENT -RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND, vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 83, 87 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
25. Article 41 imposes the requirement that "[p]rocedures concerning the enforcement of
intellectual property rights shall be fair and equitable." Id. art. 41 2. Article 30 permits
restrictions on exclusive patent rights that "do not unreasonably conflict with the normal
exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent
owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties." Id. art. 30. For restrictions that
do unreasonably conflict with the right's normal exploitation or do unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of third parties, the requirements of Article 31 are to be complied with the
requirements ofthe signatory states before such restrictions can be imposed. Id.art. 31. Provisions
equivalent to Article 30 apply to trademarks and copyrights, but there are no equivalents to Article
31 for trademarks and copyrights. Id. arts. 13, 17.
26. Here, I mean human rights in the deeper sense used by Professor Mutua. See Mutua,
supra note 21, at 201, 243 (critiquing the human rights paradigm for offering only a "script of
rights" as opposed to a system that demonstrates a respect for many cultures).
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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market proposal in each context. Part IV focuses on the efficacy of limiting
patent rights through the gray market, and Part V concludes.
II. FIXED COSTS, PUBLIC GOODS, AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS SYSTEMS

There are two poles to the debate over the protection of intellectual
property, namely the strong protection position and the open access
position." Advocates of the strong protection position contend that the
creation of intellectual property would be undermined unless the creator has
complete and nearly absolute control over the uses, distribution, and
marketing ofher intellectual property. Absent such control, less intellectual
property would be produced. At the other extreme are those who advocate
open access since intellectual property is an important input for the creation
of new works and involves expression that is important for the development
of the marketplace for ideas. This position would advocate very weak or
non-existent intellectual property rights because of democratic and
communitarian values.
Intellectual property illustrates two classic economic problems: that of
fixed costs and that of public goods provision. Strong protectionists and
open access advocates focus on only one of these two problems, ignoring
the other. A full understanding of intellectual property law entails
addressing both problems. The production of intellectual property is
expensive and involves large fixed costs.28 No one would expend such costs
unless there was some guarantee of a reasonable return to the investment.
Normally such return would be earned by selling the item produced in the
marketplace. The problem with items protected by intellectual property is
that the costs of production entail very high fixed costs and low variable
costs. Consequently, the marginal costs of production will be low. Since a
competitive market will tend to drive prices down to marginal costs, prices
in a competitive market will be driven to a point where it may not be
possible to cover fixed costs, and the enterprise will be unprofitable. This
classic fixed cost problem affects many large scale industries, such as
railroads and utilities, and has provided the rationale for regulating such

27. For an excellent historical and economic account of this debate, see Gillian K. Hadfield,
The Economics ofCopyright:An HistoricalPerspective, 38 COPYRIGHTL. SYMP. (ASCAP) 1, 3345 (1992).
28. JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDusTIAL ORGANIZATION 307-08 (1988).
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industries.29 The degree of regulation has been controversial, ranging from
direct price regulation to government management of the development of
facilities. Intellectual property provides another means of resolving the fixed
cost problem by giving the creator a strong monopoly right in the creation,
which frees the creator from the forces ofcompetition that would otherwise
make the enterprise unprofitable.
However, intellectual property evinces not only the fixed cost problem
but also the public goods problem. A public good is one that is non-rival
and non-excludable, meaning that consumption can be shared by a large
group of individuals without depleting the supply.3" On the other hand,
ordinary consumer goods, such as cars and food, are rival and excludable.
A fixed stock of these consumer goods will be depleted as consumers use
the goods, and sharing is only minimally possible. Public goods, such as
music, movies, news, and information, can be used by a potentially infinite
number of consumers without diminishing the amount ofentertainment and
information. Some public goods exhibit congestion costs, which are costs
associated with too many people using the good.3 An example outside the
area of intellectual property is provided by a public swimming pool. Many
people can share its use, but too many people raise the costs of using the
pool by increasing congestion. Such costs also arise in the context of
intellectual property use. For example, trademarks are public goods, but if
the trademark becomes overused it loses its value as an indicator of source
and quality. Too much use imposes the equivalent of congestion costs that
diminish the value of the good.32
The public goods aspect of intellectual property is captured by the clichd
"information wants to be free." A corollary ofthis clichd is that information
should be free since attempts to curb its use through price or other
mechanisms would be futile. Information is non-rival and non-excludable,
according to this argument, and therefore should be made open for all to
use. The problem with this argument is that it ignores the costs of
producing information.33 Economic theory does not state that if a good is
public that it should be free. Instead, economic theory suggests that such
goods cannot be provided through a market mechanism alone. Either the

29. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937, at 308-22 (1991)

(describing the fixed cost controversy).
30. RIcHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS,
AND CLUB GOODS 10-13 (1986).
31. Id. at 272-77.
32. ROSEMARY COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP,
APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 79-82 (1998).
33. JOHN SEELY BROWN & PAUL DUGUm, THE SOCIAL LIFE OF INFORMATION 65-66 (2000).
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government provides public goods (such as roads and national defense) or
the government subsidizes the market to provide these goods. In addition,
economists recognize the role for non-market and non-governmental
institutions, such as non-profit entities, in providing public goods.34 The
problem posed by public goods for economists and lawyers is determining
what set of institutions should be adopted to produce and provide public
goods in an economically rational and effective manner.
Before discussing how intellectual property law addresses the fixed cost
problem, the public goods problem, and how these problems result in the
development of gray markets, let me describe how economists would
propose resolving the public goods problem. One way, as discussed above,
is to have the government supply the public good and finance it with
general tax revenues." The problem with this scheme is establishing a tax
structure that is both fair and efficient. A flat tax structure would result in
some people paying more than their value for the good and some less. The
unfairness of this is obvious, especially for those who are forced to pay for
something they do not value. The scheme is also inefficient because of the
separation of payment from individual valuation. An alternative is to use a
system of user fees that will allow consumers to pay for the amount of the
public good used. Toll roads and fees for entry into parks are examples of
such user fees. The problem is that this system would work for some public
goods, such as roads and parks, but not for others, such as national defense.
Furthermore, determining the appropriate user fee structure imposes a cost
on government that must be borne somehow.
Privatization is another possible economic solution to the problem of
public goods creation and provision. Private firms could compete in the
creation and provision of public goods, and the firms could develop the
appropriate payment structure to cover their costs and guarantee a return.
The problem is that private provision of a public good may be inefficient
because of the free rider problem. If one firm provides the public good, then
there is little incentive for another firm to do so, especially since public
goods are non-rival and non-excludable by definition. Therefore,
competition will not likely survive in private markets for public goods.
Furthermore, pricing must be modified to deal with the sale of public
goods. In markets for ordinary consumer goods, firms charge the same
price for goods of a given quality and quantity. Setting such a price
structure for public goods would cause the same problem as financing

34. KENNETH J. ARRow, THE LIMrrs OF ORGANIZATION 21-23 (1974).
35. For an overview of how public goods are provided, see DENNIS C.
CHOICE 1117-25 (rev. ed. 1989).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol14/iss2/4
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public goods through taxes: some will pay more and some less than their
valuation of the public good.
The solution is to allow firms to price discriminate. Just as governments
can set user fees, firms should be allowed to price discriminate in the
pricing of public goods so that consumers pay according to their valuation
of the good. Ideally, each consumer will be charged exactly the amount
they value the good, and the firm will obtain enough revenue to recoup the
costs and earn a return. This arrangement is known as perfect price
discrimination, and economists recognize that perfect price discrimination
as efficient.36 The problems are the costs of a system of price setting
tailored to the individual consumer and the potential that discriminatory
be perfect, which may result in inefficiencies arising from
pricing may not
37
market power.
The last economic solution is to have joint production and provision of
public goods by both private and governmental entities. Education is a
public good that is provided through this mechanism in almost all countries.
Such a system has the costs of the governmental and private arrangements
described above, but also has one clear benefit: the potential for
competition between public and private entities. Even though the
competition may be limited (there may be only one private entity and only
one public entity), the mixed scheme potentially provides choices that the
separate arrangements do not.
Intellectual property law resolves the fixed cost and public goods
problems by granting a limited right of exclusion to the creator of
intellectual property." The right of exclusion gives the creator some
monopoly power to recoup the fixed costs of investment without being
subjected to the destructive forces of competition. The limitation of these
rights through provisions such as time, duration, fair use, and permitted
use, protects the public goods aspect of intellectual property. However, the
law creates a baseline against which market and business forces work to
produce and distribute intellectual property. The limited right to exclude
gives the owner of intellectual property leeway to market intellectual
property.
Technological and social methods of exclusion serve to complement the
legal methods. Territorial restrictions, retailing, and the packaging of
products permit the owner of intellectual property to further privatize the

36. Louis PHILipS, THE ECONOMICS OF PRICE DISCIMINATION 12-16 (1983).
37. For an excellent critique of the theory of price discrimination as applied to copyrights,
see Julie E. Cohen, Copyrightand the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799, 1799-1891 (2000).
38. DENNIS W. CARLTON& JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 50205 (3d ed. 2000).
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protected work and extract value from the consumer. Territorial restrictions
are imposed, for example, in franchising or through restrictions on where
and to whom intellectual property protected goods can be sold. These
restrictions further limit competition and allow the intellectual property
owner to 'extract more for the creation. Retailing goes hand-in-hand with
territorial restrictions and creates another layer in the distribution of
intellectual property. This creates value added through the provision of
service and generation of advertising and also permits the intellectual
property owner to extract value for the work. Finally, packaging serves as
an advertising function and as a means of bundling products, such as music,
which allows the owner of intellectual property to sell and extract value for
her creation. These extra-legal mechanisms permit the intellectual property
owner to recoup fixed costs and provide the incentives to create and
distribute public goods.
But exclusion mechanisms are imperfect, especially when public goods
are concerned. Territorial restrictions, regulated largely by contracts
between the manufacturer and the distributor, can be bypassed. Alternative
distribution mechanisms to retailing, such as resale by private consumers,
can be created post-sale. Goods can be unpackaged and repackaged as
consumers play songs for friends and create their own mixes. The exclusive
right to exclude can give the intellectual property owner only limited
control over the range of business and social practices that facilitate the
distribution of non-rival and non-excludable goods. It is on this point that
the clichd of information wanting to be free actually rings true; owners of
intellectual property cannot feasibly control all dimensions of its
dissemination. Gray markets, or alternate distribution mechanisms, arise to
fill in the39gaps in the distribution channels created by intellectual property
owners.

Of course, the response by intellectual property owners has been to
close the gray markets through the one tool that is potentially successful:
legal regulation. But the law of the gray market reflects a checkered and
largely unsuccessful means of restricting the gray market.4 I discuss this
body oflaw elsewhere, but summarize here, the main legal tools intellectual
property owners have used to prevent the gray market. Trade restrictions
have been of mixed success because of the authority given to agents of the
customs office in determining what gets in and what does not. Claims for
trademark infringement have been of mixed success since the trademarked
goods actually originate from the trademark owner, but only through a
39. Shubha Ghosh, Turning Gray into Green: Some Observations on Napster, HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with author).
40. Ghosh, supra note 4, at 378-82.
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different distribution mechanism. Copyright law has little weight because
of the first sale doctrine. Patent law offers the strongest support for
restricting the gray market because of the strong rights of exclusive
distribution, granted under patent law in the entire United States. But
patent law applies to a narrow set of intellectual property, namely novel,
non-obvious, and useful inventions, and hence serves as a tool for only a
few industries, such as pharmaceuticals. But even for those industries,
patent law's power has been potentially limited by Congressional legislation
allowing reimportation of certain drugs, a policy whose status is currently
under debate. Gray markets cannot be so easily closed or regulated.
The economic relationships among patent law, international trade, and
gray markets provide one basis for assessing the policy of reimportation.
Patent law gives the patent owner exclusive rights to make, use, and sell the
patented item in the domestic market. This exclusive right gives the owner
some degree of monopoly power in markets where he has patent rights. In
each market, the patent owner can package the patented item so as to
control its dissemination through the market. For example, with
pharmaceutical products, the packaging occurs through embodying the
patent in pills or other items that allow control of dosage and dispensing to
consumers. Table One depicts a typical monopoly market in two different
situations. The quantity axis measures number of pills sold, and the price
axis measures the price per pill. In each market, the patent owner can set
prices to maximize profits in the two separate markets. Price differences
arise because of differences in costs and demand in the two markets. The
price differential creates the incentive for a gray marketer to buy in the
cheaper market and resell in the more expensive market. However, under
patent law the patent owner can prevent the gray marketer from engaging
in such activity. The result is a price differential in two markets that results
from a form of price discrimination.
The debate over pharmaceuticals follows from the inequity of this price
differential, especially in the context oflife-saving pharmaceuticals. Given
the benefits from pharmaceutical products, it seems unfair, even if
consistent with market practices, that the price for the same product should
differ across markets. Furthermore, the high price in one market excludes
potential beneficiaries of the drug from access. The response to these
arguments is that it is difficult to correct the price differential and guarantee
broader access without imposing other inequities. For example, Professor
Varian has correctly pointed out that if prices were to be equalized in the
two markets through some mechanism, the question remains which price
would prevail, a price closer to the higher price or one closer to the lower
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price.4 ' If the price equalization were left to political mechanisms, then the
lower price might prevail and result in loss of profits in the high price
jurisdiction. On the other hand, price equalization may lead the higher price
to prevail in the marketplace and cause even greater loss in access. Which
result will prevail depends on the relative demands in the two countries and
the mechanism for price equalization. But whichever result prevails, other
inequities might result.
An obvious response to the price differential is to attack the monopoly
power that makes the price discrimination possible. 42 But this solution
entails challenging the vested patent rights of the patent owner and stokes
the flames of the politics of intellectual property law.43 Compulsory
licensing would create competition, but would also directly challenge the
exclusive rights granted to the patent owner to decide who should be given
the right to make, use, or sell the patented item and on what terms. 44 State
subsidies or income transfers granted to consumers ofpharmaceuticals also
are politically difficult to muster, introducing the politics of taxation into an
intellectual property debate. Attacking anti-competitive practices through
antitrust law is another possibility, but since the price differential occurs
across international borders, questions of comity and jurisdiction pose
impediments to enforcement.45 Creating gray markets, it seems, is a
politically feasible manner of ensuring competition and reducing prices.
Although the creation of gray markets challenges the patent owner's
41. CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE

NETWORK ECONOMY 44-45 (1999); see also Hal R. Varian, Economic Scene; A Big Factorin
PrescriptionDrugPricing:Location, Location, Location, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2000, at C2.
42. The Robinson-Patman Act, while ostensibly making price discrimination illegal, applies
to differential pricing by wholesalers in selling to retailers. AMERICAN BARASSOCIATION SECTION
OF ANTITRUST LAW, A PRIMER ON THE FEDERAL PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAWS: A GENERAL REVIEW
OF THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT FOR BUSINESS MANAGERS 3-8 (2d ed. 2000). For a discussion of

the Act from a business and economic perspective, see SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supranote 41, at 299300.
Article 40 of TRIPS authorizes signatory nations to control and regulate anti-competitive
uses of intellectual property rights. TRIPS, supra note 24, art. 40. The scope of this power has yet
to be explored. See CHRISTOPHER ARUP, THE NEW WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AGREEMENTS:

GLOBALIZING LAW THROUGH SERVICES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 210-11 (2000); see also
BHAGIRATH LAL DAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE WTO AGREEMENTS 124 (1998).
43. See MICHAEL RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETION AND THE POLITICS
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 8-11 (1998) (documenting economic and political forces leading to

TRIPS).
44. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTHOLOGY 305-14 (Anthony D'Amato &
Doris Estelle Long eds., 1996) (analyzing compulsory licensing in copyright and patent law as a

government taking).
45. See Eleanor M. Fox, US.and Global Competition and Trade-Jurisdictionand Comity,
ANTITRUST REP., Oct. 1993, at 3-4.
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exclusive rights, the solution has the advantages of avoiding the politics of
redistribution and the difficulties of enforcing antitrust laws globally.
Authorizing gray markets, of course, introduces additional costs as
well.46 A gray marketer will bear the cost of transportation between the two
markets and will engage in gray marketing until the price differential
between the two markets just equals the transportation costs. Gray
marketing will tend to lower the price of the product in the high price
market, which is its intended effect. But gray marketing may raise or lower
the price of the product in the market from which the gray marketer is
reimporting. The ambiguity of the effect in the low price country reflects
the two countervailing effects of gray marketing. The first is the upward
pressure on price in the low price market created by the increase in demand
for the product from the gray marketer. The second is the downward
pressure placed on price by global competition and the price equalization
between the two markets. It is possible that the second effect dominates the
first, and the price for the product will fall in both markets. It is also
possible that the price will rise in the low price market while falling in the
high price market. The outcome in the low price market depends on how
responsive demand is to price changes in the two markets. The larger point
is that while gray marketing may have the effect of lowering prices in both
markets, it also raises the possibility of benefitting consumers in the high
price market at the expense of consumers in the low price market. The
tension between the two sets of consumers raises issues for the global
politics of gray marketing.
The creation of gray markets will also affect the behavior of the patent
owner. In order to prevent the gray market and capture market share from
the gray marketer, the patent owner will adopt practices to reduce the price
differential between the two markets. The patent owner has two possible
strategic responses. The first is to alter his licensing practices by altering
royalty fees and other license terms in order to reduce the price differential
between the two markets. The second possibility is for the patent owner to
merge the business entities in the two markets so as to be able to control
the pricing policies in the two markets. The responses from the patent
owner are desirable to the extent that they tend to lower the price
differential that is the source of the problem. However, the result can be
beneficial or harmful depending upon the direction of price movements in
the two markets.

46. The economic analysis presented below is taken from my previously published work in
Ghosh, supra note 4, at 409-26.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

15

FLORIDA JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW
Florida Journal of
International Law, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 4

[Vol.

l

14

For the sake of discussion, it is useful to describe four possible
scenarios:
A=
B=
C=
D=

47

the gray market is prohibited;
the gray market
is allowed, but there is no response from the
48
owner;
patent
the gray market is allowed,
but the patent owner responds
49
through licensing terms;
the gray market is allowed, but the patent owner responds
through common control of the two markets."0

Drawing on economic analysis from my earlier work,"' I can make some
statements about how consumers and non-gray market firms would rank
these four scenarios in the high price and low price markets using a simple
model of linear demand. The rankings are as follows on the next page.52
Each set of consumers would unambiguously prefer the gray market
scenario with no response to all other scenarios. The second choice would
unambiguously be the gray market scenario with common control. There
would be disagreement over the rankings of a regime with no gray
marketing and a regime with gray marketing controlled through licensing.
Consumers in the high-price market would unambiguously choose gray
47. This scenario is analyzed under the assumption that the prohibition can occur at zero

cost. This is obviously an unrealistic assumption since the gray market may still exist even if
ostensibly illegal or policed. The case is considered, however, as an ideal case for the purposes
of comparison.

48. Under this scenario, the patent owner does not respond, either because the gray market
is legal or because the patent owner cannot control the distribution mechanisms in other countries
through contract or corporate control of business entities overseas.
49. This scenario is the most subtle and needs elaboration. The patent owner will distribute
his patent both domestically and overseas through licensing. The royalty terms of the license will
affect the price in the two markets (in conjunction with, of course, the demand for the patented
product in the two countries and the production costs). Theoretically, if the patent owner can set
the royalty terms, he can affect the price of the patented product in the two markets to make gray
marketing unprofitable. The effectiveness of this policy depends upon the ability of the patent
owner to prevent unlicensed uses. For the sake of analysis here, I assume that unlicensed uses can
be prohibited at zero cost.
50. Under this last scenario, the patent owner obtains ownership and control over the entity
distributing the patented product overseas and sets the royalty structure in each market accordingly
to maximize the joint profits of the entity and prevent gray marketing.
51. Ghosh, supra note 4, at 373-439.
52. For consumers, the rankings of the scenarios are based on the predicted price of the
product under each scenario. Scenarios ranked number one, for example, would result in the
lowest price. For firms, the rankings are based on predicted profits, with high-ranking scenarios
yielding higher profits than low-ranking scenarios.
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marketing with licensing control over a regime where gray marketing is
prohibited. Consumers in the low-price markets, however, would prefer no
gray marketing. The reason for this discrepancy is that consumers in the
high-price market will always prefer to allow gray marketing. The effect of
gray marketing in the low-price market is always ambiguous. However,
gray marketing controlled through licensing would tend to raise prices in
the low-price market while the other forms of gray marketing would tend
to lower prices in the low-price market.
The rankings of the non-gray market firm include several ambiguities.
These ambiguities mean that the comparison of profits across regimes
cannot be made without further information about demand curves and
costs. The non-gray market firm in the high-price market (that is, the
market into which gray. market goods would be entering) prefers a regime
where gray marketing is not allowed to all other regimes. Relative rankings
among gray market regimes are difficult to make. The non-gray market firm
in the high-price market would unambiguously prefer a regime where the
gray market was controlled by common control compared to one in which
the entities in the two markets were separate. But it is not possible to
compare the scenario where control of the gray market occurs through
licensing with either of the two other methods of controlling the gray
market.
Finally, the non-gray market firm in the low-price country (that is, the
source country for the gray market goods) would prefer gray marketing,
either uncontrolled or controlled through licensing to a regime where gray
marketing was prohibited. The firm would also prefer uncontrolled gray
marketing to gray marketing controlled through common ownership. But
it is not possible without further information to compare the regime of
prohibited gray marketing with that of gray marketing controlled through
common ownership in terms of the effects on the profits of the firm in the
source country. It also is not possible to compare gray marketing controlled
through licensing with either uncontrolled gray marketing or gray
marketing controlled through common ownership.
Despite such ambiguities, the analysis of the gray market scenarios
provides a basis for approaching the policies of gray marketing as proposed
in the United States and as implemented in South Africa. Two lessons
emerge from this analysis. First, gray marketing will result in responses
from the patent owner in the manner in which distribution is controlled in
both the destination country and the source country. These responses must
be taken into consideration in assessing gray marketing. Second, the effects
of gray marketing on various groups are mixed and in many cases are
ambiguous. Nonetheless, understanding these responses and their mixed
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effects is crucial in assessing the efficacy of limiting patent rights and power
through gray markets.
In this Part, I present the economics of intellectual property law and its
relationship with the economics of gray marketing. Intellectual property law
is designed to address both the fixed costs and the public goods problems
that characterize information markets. Patent law, unlike copyright and
trademark law, gives the owner an absolute right to make, use, and sell the
patented item in the market that consists of the jurisdiction of the patent.
In the context of international trade, patent law creates price differentials
for the patented item, which provides incentives for gray marketing. If gray
marketing was allowed, we would expect the patent owner to preempt gray
marketing by attempting to lower the price differentials across markets.
Gray marketing, therefore, will produce very complicated responses in
global markets depending on how the patent owner responds and the
demand and costs in all markets. With these analytical insights, I, next
address the situation in the United States and South Africa.

III. COMPARING AND CONTRASTING THE PROPOSED GRAY MARKETS
IN THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA

As described above, both the United States and the South African
governments have attempted to address the issue of access to
pharmaceuticals by the creation of markets through permissive
reimportation or gray markets. The non-economic issues raised by this
policy are addressed in Part IV. The economics of intellectual property and
gray markets delineated in Part II provide an important basis for assessing
these policies.
I will present an important structural difference between gray marketing
in the United States and in South Africa. In both countries, the problem
arises from patent owners exercising their patent rights and creating high
relative prices for the pharmaceutical product. In both countries, gray
markets are seen as providing effective competition that will lower prices
and benefit consumers. However, gray markets are created very differently
in the two cases. The following diagram illustrates the two different cases:
CASE ONE: The Round Trip
United States -+ patented pharmaceuticals -4 Canada
Canada 4 gray market pharmaceuticals -# United States
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CASE TWO:
Western Firms -11 patented pharmaceuticals -4 South Africa South Africa
4- gray market 4- India
In the case of the United States, the source and destination of the
pharmaceuticals are the same. The drugs are manufactured in Canada under
license from the U.S. patent owner or manufactured in the United States
under license and exported to Canada.53 In the case of South Africa, both
source and destination are different. Western firms that import licensed
drugs into South Africa face competition from gray marketed drugs
produced in India either under a license or without. The different structures
ofgray marketing will have different implications for their efficacy. In Case
One, the patent owner has more ability to control the gray market through
price setting that limits the price differential in the two markets. In Case
Two, the patent owner has less ability to control the gray market through
reducing price differentials. This difference in structure with resulting
implications for control is the basis for why, as an economic matter, the
South African policy would be more effective than the one in the United
States.
A. Reimportationfrom Canadato the UnitedStates
In October 2000, President Clinton signed into law an agricultural bill
that contained a provision authorizing the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, "after consultation with the United States Trade Representative
and the Commissioner ofCustoms," to promulgate "regulations permitting
pharmacists and wholesalers to import into the United States covered
products," meaning prescription drugs other than controlled substances or
biological products.54 The statutory provision was deemed to be effective
only if the Secretary demonstrated that its implementation would "pose no
additional risk to the public's health and safety... and result in a significant
reduction in the cost of covered products to the American consumer."55

53. By way of comparison, the first scenario corresponds to what Justice Ginsburg has
described as the round trip in her QualityKing concurrence. Quality King Distrib., Inc. v. L'Anza
Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 154 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). In the context of
exhaustion of rights under copyright law, the round trip scenario would lead to the exhaustion of
rights. Most likely, the second scenario, where the goods do not make a round trip, would not lead
to the exhaustion of rights. See BMG Music v. Perez, 952 F. 2d 318, 319 (9th Cir. 1991).
54. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 106-948, at 39.
55. Id. at 43.
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The statute also contained a sunset provision, which would have canceled
the legal effect of the regulations five years after going into effect.56
In December 2000, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Donna
Shalala, refused to implement the legislation, contending that there were
serious risks to health from allowing reimports of pharmaceuticals into the
United States from a foreign country.17 The Secretary also expressed doubt
that the reimportation would result in substantial reduction in the price of
drugs."s President Clinton supported her decision, causing yet another
controversy in the closing days of the Clinton Administration.59 Supporters
of the bill indicated suspicions about the influence of pharmaceutical firms
(opponents to gray marketing) on the measure.' The legislation is currently
in limbo; the newly appointed Secretary of Health and Human Services,
Tommy Thompson, described the future of the program as "doubtful."'
The preamble to the legislation lists several congressional findings on
price differentials in pharmaceuticals between countries and the alarming
rate at which the cost of prescription drugs continues to rise in the United
States.62 Congress concluded that "Americans should be able to purchase
medicines at prices that are comparable to prices for such medicines in
other countries, but efforts to enable such purchases should not endanger
the gold standard for safety and effectiveness that has been established and
maintained in the United States." 3 The appeal of allowing reimportation
was based on reports that many elderly Americans were making excursions
to Canada and Mexico solely for the purposes of obtaining prescription
drugs. Reimportation would permit access but place the transportation
costs on gray marketers.

56. Id.
57. Kaufman, supra note 19, at Al; Pear, supra note 19, at Al; Rubin, supra note 19, at Al.
The amendment permits imports from Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, New Zealand,
Switzerland, South Africa, and countries in the European Union or the European Economic Area
if the drug is authorized for general marketing in the European Economic Area. H.R. Conf. Rep.
No. 106-948, at 41 (incorporating by reference 21 U.S.C. § 382(b) in proposed section 804(f)).
I will limit my discussion to potential imports from Canada since that country has been the focus
of the debates and popular discussion.
58. Kaufman, supra note 19, at Al; Pear, supra note 19, at Al; Rubin, supra note 19, at Al.
59. Michael Kinsley, No Free Lunch at the Pharmacy,WASH. POST, Dec. 31,2000, at A33;

Kaufman, supranote 19, at AI; Pear, supra note 19, at AI; Rubin, supra note 19, at AI.
60. Kaufman, supra note 19, at Al; Pear, supra note 19, at Al; Rubin, supra note 19, at Al.
61. Sara Fritz, Election Over, PrescriptionLaw Languishes, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr.

8, 2001, at Al; Anjetta McQueen, Program to Reimport Drugs Likely to Get Axed, RECORD
(Bergen County, N.J.), Apr. 10, 2001, at Al l.
62. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 106-948, at 39.
63. Id.
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Whether reimportation is an appropriate response rests largely on the
sources for the price differential across markets. The assumption is that
such price differences stem from degrees of protection for intellectual
property in the United States and Canada. But the record suggests that
there has been a convergence in the intellectual property regimes of the two
countries over the past decade. While price differences in patented products
may in part reflect differences in regulatory environments, intellectual
property law may not be the source of the price divergence. Limiting
domestic patent rights through gray marketing may not be an appropriate
response. But, as I discuss below, an even more compelling case against
reimportation is provided by the predicted response of U.S. patent holders
to gray markets, which may harm non-U.S. consumers even as they benefit
the United States.
1. United States Background
There are two regulatory forces that shape the policy of the United
States toward the pharmaceutical industry: regulatory review for drug
safety and patent protection. The two have developed symbiotically since
the 1970s and together shape the regulatory environment in which drug
marketing occurs.'
Regulation of the pharmaceutical industry has been the subject of debate
in the United States since at least 1959, when the Kefauver Commission
issued a report with supporting materials challenging pricing and other
marketing practices in the pharmaceutical industry." The Commission
alleged monopolistic and anti-consumer practices in the industry, sparking
a debate that has continued to this day on the appropriate regulation of the
industry.66 Industry representatives at the time contended that the industry
was in fact competitive, citing low mark-ups and intensive competition in
the area of research and development.67 In the 1970s, the debate switched
to the over-regulation of the industry and the resulting unprofitability and
threats to innovation. Competitive pressures from Japan and Germany were
centered on pharmaceuticals, and the burdens of the Food and Drug
Administration approval process became the focus of attention.6" The
64. William S. Comanor, The Political Economy of the PharmaceuticalIndustry, 24 J.
ECON. LIT. 1178, 1180-81 (1986).
65. Id. at 1181-82.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. F.M. Scherer, Pricing,Profits, and Technological Progress in the Pharmaceutical
Industry, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 102, 108-14 (1993).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol14/iss2/4

22

Ghosh: Pills, Patents, and Power: State Creation of Gray Markets as a Li

2002] PILLS. PATENTS. AND POWER: STATE CREATION OF GRAYMARKETS AS A LIMIT ON PATENT RIGHTS

239

process, in itself cumbersome and expensive, was claimed to stifle the
ability of pharmaceutical firms to bring drugs to the marketplace. The
process was also believed to interfere with the patent process by effectively
shortening the life of a granted patent. Regulatory changes in the 1980s
permitted expedited review, and reforms permitted the patent owner to take
advantage of the full duration of patent life.69
The other issue was the availability of competition from generic, or
unbranded, pharmaceutical products. For generic drug manufacturers,
patent protection serves as a barrier to entry and a limitation on
competition. Since generic drugs required FDA approval, the approval
mechanism served as an additional barrier. Patent protection and safety
review posed particularly difficult problems because submission of a review
application to the FDA before the expiration of a drug patent would
constitute infringement of that patent.70 Reforms in the 1980s resolved
these problems by permitting expedited FDA review for generic drugs prior
to patent expiration.7 1 As patent protection increased for the pharmaceutical
industry, some competitive pressures were introduced through relaxation
of the regulatory barriers to generic drugs.'
Trademarks also serve as barriers to entry for generic drug
manufacturers. Often after the patent expired, pharmaceutical firms would
protect the shape and color of their drugs through trademark law. The
shape and color of a pill often served as a means of brand identification,
easing confusion among consumers and among pharmacists filling
prescriptions. Such brand identification created an additional barrier to the
entry of generic drugs. 3 Pharmaceutical firms, through their exclusive
rights to make, sell, and use the patented product, established brand loyalty
and consumer identification with pills of a certain color and shape that

69. See Comanor, supra note 64, at 1200-02 (describing patent reform); Patricia I. Carter,
Federal Regulation ofPharmaceuticals in the United States and Canada, 21 LoY. L.A. INT'L &
COMe. L. REV. 215, 227-34 (1999).

70. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(a) (2000).
71. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000). For a discussion of the background leading up to these
developments, see Comanor, supra note 64, at 1202-09; see also Henry Grabowski & John
Vernon, Longer Patents for Lower Imitation Barriers: The 1984 Drug Act, 76 AM. ECON. REV.
195, 196-98 (1986); Scherer, supra note 68, at 100-03.
72. The battle between patented pharmaceuticals and generic drugs in the United States
continues today. In 2001, two courts, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and the
U.S. District Court in Maryland, split on allowing two different pharmaceutical firms to prevent
the marketing of generic drugs by extending their protection for a patented drug through the life
of the patent. Melody Peterson, Judge Says Mylan Can Sell Generic Version ofBristol-Myers
Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2001, at C9.
73. SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharm. Labs., Inc., 625 F. 2d 1055, 1057 (3d Cir. 1980).
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made it difficult for generic drug manufacturers to establish a consumer
base and differentiate their product, except through price. As of this date,
the relationship between trademark protection and patent protection is still
an open question.
The Singer Manufacturing Co. and the Kellogg Co. cases from 1896
and 1938, respectively, held that expiration of the patent prevented
enforcement of any trademarks in the patented product.74 However, these
cases are not directly relevant to protection of the shape and color of pills
because the patent and trademark protect very different dimensions of the
pill. The patent protects the process by which the pill was manufactured or
the composition of matter comprising the pill; the trademark protects the
pill's packaging and associated goodwill. A recent Seventh Circuit decision,
in fact, held that expiration of a design patent did not preempt trademark
protection for the design."' The U.S. Supreme Court recently decided a
case involving trade dress protection for an arguably functional design that
had been patented.7 6 The Court decided the case on grounds other than
patent preemption and did not address the question of whether an expired
patent negates trademark protection.77 The legal question in the United
States is still open.
Patent protection for pharmaceuticals has provided the industry with
strong protection from competition. The extension of patent life to comply
with regulatory approval and the protection from generic competition serve
to give pharmaceutical firms a strong degree of market control. This
control extends to protection against foreign imports of pharmaceuticals.
Legislation in the late 1980s allowed a patent owner to enjoin the
importation of a product that was manufactured overseas by a process
patented in the United States, even if the product itself was not patented.7"
Furthermore, a patent owner is given exclusive rights to make, use, and sell

74. Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185-200 (1896) (denying protection
to the Singer trademark after expiration of patent); Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 1!1,
116-20 (1938).
75. Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc., 12 F.3d 632,636-43 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that trademark
protection for design is not an infinite patent). But see Vomado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v.
Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1500(I0th Cir. 1995) (foreclosing trademark protection on design
after a patent expires when the "product configuration is a significant inventive component of an
invention covered by a utility patent.").
76. Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., No. 99-1571, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 2457, at
12-23 (Mar. 20, 2001) (holding that design is not protected as trade dress, because it is
functional).
77. Id.
78. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2000).
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the patented product within the United States. 9 Patent law provides the
owner with an exclusive territory which, when combined with trademark
protection for the product, gives protection to the owner from interbrand
competition. With this as a background, it is easy to see how the
preconditions can exist for the creation of a gray market in pharmaceuticals.
A consideration of the Canadian regulatory environment explains why
Canada becomes the likely source for gray marketed pharmaceuticals.
2. Canada Background
A comparison of the regulatory systems governing pharmaceuticals in
the United States and Canada uncovers many similarities in design despite
differences in institutional backgrounds.80 The convergence is a recent
phenomenon, as changes to patent law, beginning in 1987, attempt to
mimic the U.S. system of patent protection. This mimicking was arguably
not conscious and was most likely motivated by the policy goals of
strengthening the pharmaceutical industry and its ties to health care.8 As
Professors Doem and Sharaput described the reforms: "Patents set the
conditions ofprofit for the manufacturers of pharmaceuticals, and it is this
which allows
patents to be used to exert a structural influence over the
82
industry."

If patent law was being used to strengthen the pharmaceutical industry
in 1987 and thereafter, then patent law prior to 1987 was focused on
consumer protection and competition. The patent regime that existed in
Canada from 1869 to 1987 was strikingly different from its U.S.
counterpart and very likely set the institutional structure that permitted
competition and development in the Canadian pharmaceutical industry. In
the 1920s, Canada's patent law was amended to allow extensive
compulsory licensing for patented items that served a public purpose and
encompassed manufacture within Canada. 3 However, it was in the 1960s
that the Canadian government addressed the problem ofhigh prices and low
competition in the pharmaceutical industries. Bill C- 190, which was tabled
in the late 1960s, was part of a larger policy package designed to bring
competition to the pharmaceutical industry through lower tariffs for
79. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000).
80. Carter, supra note 69, at 215 ("The development of [the Canadian and U.S.] drug
regulatory systems has often paralleled each other.").
81. G. BRUCE DOERN & MARKUS SHARAPUT, CANADIAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE
POLITICS OF INNOVATING INSTITUTIONS AND INTERESTS 134-43 (2000).

82. Id. at 148-49.
83. Id. at 34-38.
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imported pharmaceuticals and by permitting the importation of drugs into
the Canadian market.S4 Canada had already provided weaker protection for
pharmaceuticals than the United States by protecting pharmaceutical
patents as process and not product patents. This distinction meant that
patent owners' rights extended only to the process by which the product
was made and not the product itself.8 5 Finally, the changes in the 1960s
expanded the role for compulsory licensing of manufacturing by relaxing
the requirement that patents subject to the compulsory license had to be
manufactured in Canada. Under the reforms, the pharmaceuticals could be
manufactured overseas
and the compulsory license would permit sales
6
within Canada.1
The 1980s and particularly the 1990s witnessed a reversal in the weak
patent protection accorded to pharmaceuticals under the legislation from
the 1960s. 7 The first big change was the extension of the patent life to
twenty years from the date of grant from the previous term often years (or
seven, ifthe patent was manufactured from Canadian fine chemicals). The
other, more substantial change was the repeal of all compulsory licensing
for pharmaceuticals. 9 The current system is one that accords very strong
patent protection to pharmaceuticals and reverses the goals of competition
and consumer access under the previous regime. But the intellectual
property protection for pharmaceuticals is not completely impenetrable. In
1997, the High Court of Canada denied trademark protection to the shape
and color of pills, reasoning that such markers were meant to protect
pharmacists from confusion in filling prescriptions and consumers from
confusion in recognizing the correct product.' ° The shape and color, the
Court decided, were not designed to indicate the source of the product;
trademark law's sole purpose under Canadian law is source identification. 9
This ruling provides hope for generic manufacturers in the Canadian
pharmaceutical industry.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 46-48.
Id. at 50.
DOERN & SHARAPUT, supra note 81, at 47.
Id. at 134-43.
Id. at 134-35.
Id.at 135.
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Novopharm, Ltd., [1997] 73 C.P.R. 3d 371, 422-23.
Id. at 421.
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3. Assessment
My description of the pharmaceutical industries of the United States and
Canada indicates the basis for the creation of a gray market in drugs. The
regulatory and intellectual property regimes create high prices in the United
States and low prices in Canada. The reimportation bill is an attempt to
take advantage of this price differential by authorizing a gray market.
However, the structure of the gray market is one that may not lead to
the intended effects. What needs to be considered in assessing the efficacy
of the gray market are the possible responses within the industry to the gray
market. If the industry does not respond and the gray market is created,
then the first, and best, situation would arise. As Table One in Part II
indicates, both sets of consumers would prefer an uncontrolled gray market.
Unfortunately, U.S. firms would least prefer an uncontrolled gray market.
Therefore, we would expect U.S. firms to react either through merger, by
entering into other corporate control arrangements with Canadian firms, or
through licensing practices. If corporate control arrangements are entered
into, such as through joint ventures, mergers. between Canadian and U.S.
firms, or entry of U.S. subsidiaries into the Canadian market, then the
second best situation would arise. As Table One indicates, both sets of
consumers would rank gray market with corporate control as their second
choice. The problem is that such corporate arrangements would require
consent by both U.S. and Canadian firms, and Canadian firms would prefer
a separate existence to common corporate control.
Therefore, it is likely that U.S. pharmaceutical firms will exercise their
control through licensing practices. While U.S. consumers would prefer
gray markets controlled by licensing to no gray markets at all, Canadian
consumers would prefer no gray markets to gray markets controlled
through licensing. The reimportation bill would make U.S. consumers
better off, but it would do so at the expense of Canadian consumers when
the potential responses by U.S. and Canadian pharmaceutical industries are
taken into consideration. While I do not purport to quantify the full benefits
and costs of the reimportation bill here, I do conclude that the bill may not
have all the desired benefits for U.S. consumers and would affect the
licensing practices of U.S. firms in a way that may result in benefits to
Canadian firms.
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B. The South African Experience
In January 2001, forty pharmaceutical firms in conjunction with the
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association of South Africa reinstated a
lawsuit against ten members ofthe South African government, including the
Minister of Health and the Registrar of Patents, challenging the Medicines
and Related Substances Control Amendment Act of 1997 (1997
Amendment).92 The case was initiated in 1998 and dropped in 1999 due to
political pressures. The 1997 Amendment permits the development of
generic AIDS drugs in South Africa under compulsory licensing and
permits parallel imports of cheap AIDS drugs into South Africa.93 The
source of the parallel imports is largely from India, which until recently did
not recognize patents on medicine (but has enacted legislation granting
patent protection that will be effective in 2005). 94 The lawsuit alleged that
the 1997 Amendment grants to the Minister of Health unfettered discretion
to regulate the pharmaceutical industry and "to deprive owners of
intellectual property in respect of pharmaceutical products of such
property" or "alternatively to expropriate such property without any
provision for compensation. ' 95 The complaint also alleged that the 1997
Amendment violates Article 27 of TRIPS, which defines patentable subject
matter and the scope of patent rights." Oral hearings in the case were held
in Pretoria on March 5,2001, under a storm of protest. 97 The plaintiffs have

92. Pharm. Mfrs. Ass'n v. President of the Republic of S. Aft., No. 4183/98 (Transvaal
Provincial Div., filed Feb. 18, 1998), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/pharma
suit.htmi (last visited Sept. 28, 2001).
93. Pat Sidley, Experts Hammer Out Drugs Rules, Bus. DAY (S. Aft.), Apr. 26,2001, at 3.
94. Sara Boseley, Legal Roadshow Rolls on to Brazil, GUARDIAN (London), Apr. 20,2001,
at 13; Donald G. McNeil Jr., Selling Cheap "Generic" Drugs,India'sCopycatsIrk Industry, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 1, 2000, at Al.
95. Pharm.Mfrs. Ass'n, No. 4183/98, § 2.3.
96. Id. § 2.4.
97. Robert Block, Big DrugFirms Defend Right to Patentson AIDS Drugsin South African
Court, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2001, at A3.
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since dropped the suit,9" but the South African government is still struggling
with implementation of the 1997 Amendment."
The policy of the South African government is in response to the AIDS
crisis in South Africa (and in much of the developing world) and is in line
with the policies of many other countries, including Thailand and Brazil.'00
According to the AIDS law project, access to pharmaceutical treatment is
prohibitive and exacerbated by conditions in the health care infrastructure:
The total pharmaceutical bill for South Africa during 1995 stood at
R6.4 billion or U.S. $1 billion. The public sector prescription drug
bill accounted for R1.6 billion (78% population). While the private
sector prescription medicines counted [sic] for R3.1 billion (22%
population). Medicines sold over the counter accounted for R1.7
billion or U.S. $300 million. It is clear that the private sector is
particularly profitable for the pharmaceutical industry. Medicines are
still the single largest item of expenditure for private medical
insurance schemes. The unequal distribution of medicines and their
costs ensure that the majority of South Africans are denied quality
care and treatment. The attempts by the government to establish
essential drug lists and to introduce generics have been resisted at
every step by the pharmaceutical industry and many private sectors
[sic] doctors.
Even access to drugs for opportunistic infections in HIV/AIDS are
increasingly limited. This includes no treatment for CMV retinitis,
cryptococcal meningitis, or even serious cases of candida. In 1998,
intravenous acyclovir was only available in 31% of hospitals;

98. On Apr. 19, 2001, the pharmaceutical firms settled with the South African government
and agreed to provide more affordable AIDS treatment to victims in South Africa.
In response to resounding global denunciation of their lawsuit, 39
[pharmaceutical firms] today unconditionally dropped the case they pursued for
three years against the South African government. The end of the lawsuit clears
the path for the 1997 Medicines Act to go into force, allowing importation of
affordable medicines and increased use of quality generic drugs.
Joint Press Release, Mddecins Sans Frontifres, Oxfam, Treatment Action Campaign,
Pharmaceutical firms in South Africa Capitulate Under Barrage of Public Pressure: Powerful
Precedent Set for Other Developing Countries (Apr. 19, 2001), available at
http://lists.essential.org/pipermaiVpharm-policy/2001-April/000944.html.
99. Sidley, supra note 93, at 3.
100. See Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 31 (describing policies in Brazil and Thailand).
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flucanazole was available in less than 30% while ciprofloxacin was
available in 73% of clinics.''
In post-Apartheid South Africa, concerns over economic rights and
access to health care, and especially the promotion of fair opportunity and
equal rights, have been the focus of government policy. Nowhere have
these concerns been more salient than in the treatment and prevention of
AIDS.
The response of South Africa contrasts with the responses of other
countries, which have been heralded as success stories in controlling the
AIDS crisis. Thailand and Brazil provide such examples. In both Thailand
and Brazil, the governments responded by providing free and reduced cost
treatment to AIDS sufferers and promoted the production of the AIDS
drugs.° 2 The Brazilian government started to manufacture generic versions
of the pharmaceutical products in 1998 after the costs of importing brandname drugs became prohibitive. 0 3 Although Brazil passed patent legislation
in 1996 to comply with the WTO and TRIPS, the legislation exempts
patent protection for "anything commercialized anywhere in the world by
May 14, 1997."'' 4 Patent owners who sold their patented item anywhere
prior to May 14, 1997 (the effective date of the 1996 Patent Act),
exhausted their rights.'0 5 According to one report, "[t]he price of AIDS
drugs with no Brazilian generic equivalent dropped 9 percent from 1996 to
that compete with generics from Brazilian labs
2000. The price of those
' 16
dropped 79 percent."
Touted as a model for the developing world, Brazil demonstrates how
competition in the pharmaceutical industry can be fostered by limits on
patent rights. What is perhaps key to Brazil's success is the non-recognition
of patent rights for patented items sold before the enactment of their patent
law. Such a broad scope of exhaustion of rights permits competition

101. Zackie Achmat, We Can Use Compulsory Licensing and ParallelImports: A South
African Case Study, available at http: //www.hri.ca/partners/alp/tac/license.shtml (last visited
Apr. 12, 2001).
102. Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 28, 31; see also Christopher S. Mayer, The Brazilian
PharmaceuticalIndustry Goes Walking From Ipanema to Prosperity: Will the New Intellectual
Property Law Spur Domestic Investment?, 12 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 377, 377-80 (1998);
Rosemary Sweeney, Comment, The US. Pushfor Worldwide PatentProtectionfor DrugsMeets
the AIDS Crisis in Thailand: A Devastating Collision, 9 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'Y J. 445, 456-58
(2000) (discussing Thailand's policy).
103. Rosenberg, supranote 3, at 28.
104. Id. at31.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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without the difficulties faced by the South African government in limiting
intellectual property rights. South Africa's patent law dates back to the
1960s, and therefore patent owners have some vested rights that are
protected from retroactive legislation. Permitting gray market
pharmaceuticals serves as a political compromise, which, although limiting
the patent owner's right of exclusivity in South Africa, may be broadly
protected by international principles of exhaustion.
Although South Africa may not match Brazil's success in lowering
costs, a gray market strategy may nonetheless be very effective. An
empirical study of gray marketing of pharmaceuticals in the United
Kingdom estimated that gray markets would reduce prices for
pharmaceutical products on average from between thirty-three percent and
forty-one percent, depending upon the product and the base price used for
comparison.10 7 The study also demonstrated the wide range of prices that
a gray marketer would provide depending upon the source country.'0 8 For
example, the U.K. list price for Zerit, an AIDS drug manufactured by
Bristol-Myers Squibb, was £ 171.98."° The equivalent price from a gray
marketer ranged from £ 65.99, if supplied by a Spanish gray marketer, to
£ 193.20, if supplied by a gray marketer from the United States. "0 The gray
market is in itselfa varied and complex distribution mechanism that reflects
differences across countries in business regulation, supply costs, and tastes.
The response of the United States to the policies of South Africa
portrays the politics of gray marketing and intellectual property rights. Until
1999, South Africa was on the "301 Watch List," a list of countries
compiled by the U.S. Trade Representative that are in violation of
international treaty obligations under the former GATT."' The United
States's position was that South Africa was not in compliance with
obligations under international law in recognizing and protecting intellectual
property rights. The dropping of South Africa from the list in 1999 was
influenced partly by domestic protests against pharmaceutical firms and
partly by a shift in the Clinton administration, evidenced by the June 25,
1999, letter from Vice-President Al Gore to Representative James Clyburn,
Chair ofthe Congressional Black Caucus, supporting compulsory licensing

107. James Love, Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Bill and South
African Reform ofPharmaceuticalPolicies,availableat http://www.cptech.org/pharn/sa/sa-1097.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2001).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Editions of the "301 Watch List," availableat http://www.ustr.gov/enforcement/special.
pdf (last visited June 5, 2001).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

31

JOURNAL OFINTERNA7ONAL LAW
Florida Journal ofFLORIDA
International
Law, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 4

[Vol. 14

and parallel importation in South Africa." 2 President Bush, although he has
not discussed the South African policy in great detail, has made statements
that ostensibly support South Africa's attempt to promote competition in
its pharmaceutical market." 3
Albeit with mixed support in the United States, the use of gray markets
to promote competition in the pharmaceutical industry illustrates an
interesting convergence of policies in the United States and South Africa.
Needless to say, the pharmaceutical industry is not a supporter of gray
markets in either country. In the United States, industry opposition has
been voiced through lobbying efforts, and through a lawsuit in South
Africa. Furthermore, some pharmaceutical firms have attempted to respond
to the crisis in South Africa by providing the drugs for free or at a reduced
cost. The response by the U.S. Government has been mixed, reflecting
perhaps the influence of the pharmaceutical firms on administrations in
transition.
In assessing and comparing the policies, it is important to recognize how
different the gray markets are in the United States and South Africa. In the
United States, the proposed gray market is a scheme of reimportation under
which drugs sold by U.S. firms in the Canadian market are bought and
resold in the United States. In South Africa, the sources of gray market
drugs are not Western pharmaceutical firms, but are manufacturers from
other developing countries that resell in South Africa. "4 This difference in
structure has important implications for the effectiveness of gray marketing.
Reimportation of pharmaceuticals in the United States gives the
pharmaceutical firms greater control over the gray market than
reimportation in South Africa. Since the source of the gray market drugs
in the United States are drugs sold into Canada by U.S. pharmaceutical
firms, the U.S. firms can effectively control the size of the gray market.

112. Letter from Al Gore, Vice-President of the United States, to James E. Clyburn, U.S.
House of Representatives (June 25,1999), available athttp://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/vp-feb25-99.html.
113. Denise Gellene, Aids Drug Pricing Controversy Opens Door to Wider Debate, L.A.
TIME , Mar. 25, 2001, at Cl; Raja Mishra, US.Pursues Aids-Drug Profit Abroad, B. GLOBE,
Apr. 22, 2001, at Al.
114. "Indian firms lead the world in the manufacture of generic AIDS drugs. The managing
director of Cipla, Ltd., an Indian generic manufacturer that meets international quality standards,
told me in December that he could make a triple therapy for $500 per year, plus another $200 in
packaging costs." Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 31. For an overview of the principle of exhaustion,
see W.R. Cornish, The FreeMovement of Goods 1:Pharmaceuticals,Patentsand ParallelTrade,
and Belinda Isaac, The Free Movement of Goods 11:Pharmaceuticals,Patents and Parallel
Imports, in PHARMACE=ICAL MEDICINE, BIOTECHNOLOGY, AND EUROPEAN LAW 11-44 (Richard
Goldberg & Julian Lonbay eds., 2000).
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While such control may be desirable, as it may lead to price reductions and
narrowing of the price differential between the two markets, the control
over the gray market by U.S. firms can limit the effectiveness of the
reimportation policy. In the South African case, on the other hand,
manufacturers in other developing countries are the source of the gray
market drugs. The Western pharmaceutical firms cannot control the flow
of gray market drugs into South Africa. Therefore, gray market policies in
South Africa will be more effective in promoting competition in the
pharmaceutical industry than gray market policies in the United States.
A review of the economic analysis as summarized by Table One
provides a basis for comparison. The firm in the destination country can
control the gray market either through licensing practices in the destination
and source country, or by merging or entering into some other type of
corporate control arrangement with the firms in the source country. As
discussed above, the firm in the source country would prefer to maintain its
separate existence and would fight attempts to merge. The recourse for the
destination country's firm would be to control gray marketing through
licensing, which would be the worst outcome for consumers in the source
country and would be the least desirable form of gray marketing for
consumers in the destination country. Permitting reimportation into the
United States may not be an effective means of lowering prices in the
United States. Any benefits to U.S. consumers would come at the expense
of consumers in the source country.
The South African program for creating gray markets would benefit
consumers in both the source and the destination countries and also provide
benefits for firms in the source country. These benefits would arise largely
at the expense of Western pharmaceutical firms. Due to the structure of the
gray market for pharmaceuticals in South Africa, Western pharmaceutical
firms cannot control the source of the gray market goods. Consequently,
the South African policy would lead to the creation of an uncontrolled gray
market. As Table One indicates, consumers in both the source and the
destination countries would prefer an uncontrolled gray market, as would
firms in the source country. However, firms in the destination country
(here, the Western pharmaceutical firms that would have exclusive rights
to the South African market absent the gray market) would find the
uncontrolled gray market to be the least desirable outcome. For these
reasons, the gray market policies in South Africa would be more effective
in regulating costs than the proposed policy in the United States.
My assessment of the gray market policies rests on the economics of
gray marketing and the pharmaceutical industry. The analysis raises
questions of the legality of the policy - questions raised in the South
African lawsuit. If the benefits from gray marketing come at the expense of
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Western pharmaceutical firms, as I conclude, does not this finding
strengthen the case against the South African Government? More broadly,
how is the creation of a gray market that provides competition to a patent
owner to be reconciled with exclusive rights granted to a patent owner?
These questions raise other issues about the efficacy of gray marketing, as
well as its legality. If the goal is to provide access and establish
competition, why not adopt policies other than gray marketing, such as
income redistribution, the creation of more effective institutions, and
infrastructure for the transfer of health care, or preventative disease
policies?" 5 While I cannot address all of these questions in this Article, I
turn to the non-economic issues raised by gray markets in the next Part.

IV. TOWARDS

AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE LIMITS OF GRAY MARKETS

What is intriguing about the use of gray markets in regulating the
pharmaceutical industry is the use by sovereigns ofmarkets to address what
has been seen as, and largely is, a human rights issue. My analysis in this
Article has been on the economics of gray marketing; my goal has been to
fill a gap in our economic understanding of gray markets. The common
perception is that gray markets serve to narrow a price gap between two
markets. While this is certainly an important function of gray markets, it is
important to understand how patent owners can regulate the gray market
through licensing and corporate control decisions. The economics of gray
marketing are more complicated than the mere arbitrage of a price
differential. Instead, gray marketing occurs against a background of
intellectual property rights and decisions about corporate structure and
distribution.
While the economic analysis is helpful, the policy choice entailed in the
creation of gray markets is not purely an economic one. Economic
consequences are important to ascertain and assess in policy determination,
but the economic consequences must be understood in conjunction with
other non-economic values that are raised by the distribution of potentially

115. One possibility that I do not discuss in this Article, but which is worth noting, is that
gray marketing policies may strategically support compulsory licensing under the Paris Convention
on Industrial Property and TRIPS. If patent holders respond to gray markets in ways that violate
the working requirements of the Paris Convention or through anti-competitive techniques, then
the state can make a stronger case for infringing on patent rights through compulsory licensing.
Note that the policy of South Africa consists of both compulsory licensing and opening up gray
markets. I would like to thank Professor Jerome Reichman for raising this point with me.
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life-saving products. I address three issues in this section: (1) the question
of exhaustion; (2) the tension between human rights and economic rights;
and (3) issues of sovereignty and the vesting of patent owners' rights.
A. The Principle of Exhaustion Versus the Right of Exclusion
The principle of exhaustion limits the rights of the patent owner in
controlling the distribution of the patented item in the jurisdiction granting
patent protection. In the United States, the principle is recognized in the
first sale doctrine, which limits the right of the patent owner to control
distribution to the first sale of the patented item. However, the first sale
doctrine for patent law applies only to first sales within the United States
since the patent owner is also granted the exclusive right to import the
patented item into the United States. Within the European Union, the
exhaustion principle applies to sales of the patented item in any of the
member countries, regardless of where the patent owner has received
patent protection. In the case of Merck & Co. v. Stephar,B. V, the owner
of a patent on a drug in the Netherlands attempted to enjoin the
reimportation of the patented drug from Italy where the drug was
unpatented. "6 The owner had not sold the drugs in the Netherlands, but the
patent owner's rights were exhausted by the sale in Italy even though the
drug was not patented there." 7
The principle of exhaustion offers a curious blend of universalism and
territorialism. The first sale of a patented item relieves the patent owner of
his exclusive distribution rights and makes the right of distribution fall into
the public domain. But the loss of exclusivity applies only to the region
within which the patent rights are recognized. Seemingly, the patented item
is in the public domain but not in the public domain at the same time, a
paradox that is resolved by understanding the definition of"public domain."
The relevant public is defined by the geographic scope of the patent rights.
In the United States, the geographic scope is the boundaries of the United
States; in the European Union, the scope is the boundaries of the member
countries of the Union. In effect, patent law creates two publics. The first
is defined by the sovereign granting the rights; the second is everyone else.
Exclusive distribution rights may be lost by the first sale to the first public,
but not to the second.

116. Case 187/80, Merck & Co. v. Stephar BV, 1981 E.C.R. 2063
117. Id.
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Understanding the principle of exhaustion in relation to the relevant
sovereignty elucidates the principle of exhaustion as it exists under TRIPS.
Article 28 of TRIPS confers onto the patent owner the exclusive rights:
(a) where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third
parties not having [the owner's] consent from the acts of: making,
using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes that
prodiuct;
(b) where the subject matter of a patent is a process, to prevent third
parties not having [the owner's] consent from the act of using the
process, and from the acts of: using, offering for sale, selling or
importing for these. purposes at least the product obtained directly
by that process.'
These provisions are qualified by Article 6, which states that "[t]his
right, like all other rights conferred under this Agreement in respect of the
use, sale, importation or other distribution of goods, is subject to the
provisions of Article 6.""' Under Article 6, "nothing in this Agreement
shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property
rights.' 20 Article 6 is subject to the requirements of national treatment and
most-favored-nation treatment under Articles 3 and 4.121 Under TRIPS, the
principle of exhaustion is a matter of national law that limits the exclusive
rights of the patent owner. However, the principle cannot be used in a way
that discriminates against foreign nationals in violation of the requirement
of national treatment. Furthermore, a TRIPS signatory cannot apply the
principle of exhaustion in a way that discriminates among fellow signatories
without running afoul of the requirements of most-favored-nation
treatment.
Signatories to TRIPS have great discretion in how to fashion the
principle of exhaustion within theirjurisdictions 2 2 As in the United States,
the principle can be applied solely within the boundaries of the jurisdiction,
or, as in the European Union, the principle can be applied to the larger
trading territory without regard to differences in patent law. The question

118. TRIPS, supra note 24, art. 28.
119. Id. art. 28 n.6.
120. Id. art. 6.
121. Id. art. 3-4.
122. See Sweeney, supranote 102, at 455-56 (discussing the ambiguous treatment of parallel
imports under TRIPS). See generally Claude E. Barfield & Mark A. Groombridge, Parallel Trade
in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Implications for Innovation, Consumer Welfare, and Health
Policy, 10 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 185 (1999).
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remains how the exhaustion principle is to be applied in developing
countries with emerging patent law, like South Africa. South African patent
law gives the patent owner the exclusive right to use, sell, manufacture, or
import the patented item in South Africa. 23 The Act is silent on the
principle of exhaustion. Gray marketed drugs in South Africa would
infringe the patent owner's rights unless the principle of exhaustion
extinguished the exclusive rights to distribute in South Africa. Such
exhaustion would occur if the patent owner had sold the patented item
before it was reimported into South Africa. However, in the context of
South African policy the drugs are being produced in another developing
country before being reimported into South Africa. They are not being
distributed by pharmaceutical firms before being reimported. Consequently,
it is doubtful that the principle of exhaustion would protect the gray market
in South Africa.
The principle of exhaustion is less likely to apply when the patent owner
is not selling or otherwise transacting with the potential gray marketer. If
the gray marketer is not obtaining the patented item from the patent owner,
but instead manufactures the patented item in a jurisdiction that does not
recognize the patent or provides limitations on the patent owner's rights
(such as in India), then the importation of the gray market good is not
protected under the principle of exhaustion. However, if the gray marketer
does purchase the item from the patent owner, and then reimports in
competition with the patent owner, the gray marketing would be protected
under the principle of exhaustion. The application of the principle is
inconsistent with the economic analysis of controlled gray marketing.
Consumers would prefer uncontrolled gray marketing to controlled gray
marketing, but uncontrolled gray marketing is more likely to occur when
the patent owner cannot exercise control over the gray market either
through licensing practices or through corporate control. It is precisely
when the patent owner cannot exercise such control that the exhaustion
principle will not apply and gray marketing would be prohibited. The
principle of exhaustion protects controlled gray marketing but not
uncontrolled gray marketing to the detriment of consumers in both
countries.
The conflict between economic analysis and legal analysis raises
questions about whether the principle of exhaustion is the appropriate
principle under which to protect gray marketing. As discussed in this Part,
the principle works to prevent a form of gray marketing that is highly

123. Section 45 of Patents Act 57 of 1978 (S. Afr.), availableat http://www.cptech.org/ip/
health/sa/patlaw.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2001).
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beneficial to consumers. If gray marketing is meant to serve consumerist
ends, then it is best justified by a legal theory that protects the form of gray
marketing that is the most consumer friendly. The principle of exhaustion
is, in the context of gray marketing, antithetical to pro-consumer values.
B. Human Rights and Economic Rights
Within U.S. jurisprudence, human rights and economic rights have been
viewed as distinct and often in conflict. Human rights jurisprudence in the
United States has, as its domain, protection of political rights, protection
of privacy (usually limited to reproductive and sexual freedom), and
protection of bodily and emotional integrity from the coercive power of the
state and, in some rare instances, of private individuals. Economic rights
jurisprudence, in contrast, focuses on the right to private property and the
right to economic sustenance and well-being. The dichotomy in U.S.
thinking, however, is not shared by the rest of the world. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights recognizes economic freedom (such as
freedom from want) and the right to health care, education, and sustenance,
as core human rights. 24 International covenants, such as the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, recognize rights in culture,
especially in what would be called rights in indigenous knowledge and
cultural property. 2 ' Human rights and economic rights are more closely
integrated outside the U.S. context.
Intellectual property rights challenge the dichotomy between human
rights and economic rights, even in the United States. With a focus on
property ownership, commerce and exchange, intellectual property rights
seemingly fall into the category of economic rights. But intellectual
property systems protect cultural expressions and protect access rights
through fair use. In this way, intellectual property rights implicate noneconomic rights as well. Within the United States, this tension is reconciled
by casting intellectual property law in purely utilitarian terms, terms not
protective of the author's personality or of rights protected by other bodies
of law, such as the First Amendment. However, recently U.S. intellectual
property law has had to face the non-economic dimensions of intellectual
property and break out of its utilitarian straight jacket. Issues raised by
indigenous knowledge protection in the developing world and Native

124. Universal Declarationof Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, (1948),
available at http://www.un.org/ Overview/rights.html (last visited June 5, 2001).
125. See Coombe, supranote 22, at 59-60.
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American property in the United States stretch existing intellectual property
doctrine and regimes to protect non-economic values and aspects of culture
divorced from commercial uses. International treaty obligations under the
Berne Convention require recognition of some form of moral or author's
rights, which have been implemented, albeit narrowly, through the Visual
Artists Rights Act (VARA).'26 Finally, legal claims of free speech and
freedom of exercise have been raised in intellectual property infringement
cases although with little success for the claimants.
The debate over pharmaceuticals is another example of the continuing
confrontation between economic and non-economic (or human) rights. The
solution of gray marketing, largely a political compromise, reflects an
intriguing use of the market to correct a problem of distribution and access.
Another example of a market means to reach human rights ends is provided
by the use of competition policy in South Africa and Indonesia, as
documented by Professor Eleanor Fox.' 21 Professor Fox points out that
competition policy has been and can be used in South Africa and Indonesia
to challenge the control that ethnic majorities have over minorities.12s While
competition policy has often been seen as a means of achieving economic
efficiency, or the maximization of aggregate social wealth without
consideration of its distribution, Professor Fox suggests that such policy
can also be used to redistribute resources from the economically powerful
to those who are weaker. 129 Such redistribution occurs through leveling of
the market playing field and lowering entry barriers to improve access to
the marketplace. 3 ' Leveling the field and lowering the barriers also have
the effect of promoting competition and improving aggregate wealth.
Professor Fox's argument is a very conventional process - based on
understanding of redistribution and efficiency. By focusing legal regulation
on the protection of market and political outsiders, competition can be
fostered in market and political processes with benefits for society as a
whole. Gray marketing policies, I would argue, are of a different species
than process - based policies. Gray markets foster competition by creating
an additional channel of access for consumers in the marketplace. They
work in one dimension; the lowering of price. The market process is not
necessarily corrected nor is a level playing field created. The creation of a
gray market does not foreclose the possibility of incumbent firms

126. Visual Artists Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2001).
127. Eleanor M. Fox, Equality, Discrimination, and Competition Law: Lessons From and
For South Africa and Indonesia, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 579 (2000).
128. Id. at 583.
129. Id. at 593.
130. Id.
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controlling the gray market through licensing or corporate policies. Instead,
the state has created a channel for distribution made possible by global price
differences otherwise foreclosed by rights of exclusion created by
intellectual property law.
Gray markets, in a certain sense, do not create new rights. They create
new institutions that place some limitations on the patent owner's rights.
Whether they protect or create economic or human rights is an unimportant
and ultimately nebulous question. Instead, gray markets highlight that what
is at stake in intellectual property systems is the relationship between
ownership and control. One's views about how intellectual property
systems should be structured rest on one's acceptance of the following two
normative propositions:
Proposition One: The creator of intellectual property should be its
owner.
Proposition Two: The owner of intellectual property should have
absolute control over its distribution."'
If one accepts both of these propositions, then the resulting intellectual
property system would be one of strong intellectual property rights. If one
rejects both, then the resulting system is one of open access. Most
proponents of intellectual property law reject one of these propositions. In
the context of gray market policies, the debate is over the second
proposition, with supporters of gray marketing contending that
unauthorized distribution should not imply illegal distribution. But
supporters of gray marketing also need to consider the other means of
control that can be exercised by intellectual property owners through
licensing and corporate control decisions.
I state the debate in terms of these two propositions, because I feel they
are ultimately more helpful than thinking in dichotomies such as human and
economic rights. The two propositions also are more precise than process
based applications of legal doctrine to protect minority rights, whether they
are categorized as human rights or economic rights. The key questions for
the creation of intellectual property systems are: who should be the owner,
who should be able to exercise control, and the logically prior questions of
what can and cannot be owned or controlled. The gray market debate, and
the economic analysis of Part II, illustrates the difficult problems in

131. Shubha Ghosh, Ownership, Control, and the Public Domain: The Case of Indigenous

Knowledge Protection (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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determining ownership and control issues when ownership can be
established and control exercised in strategic, and not always predictable,
ways; But recognizing the roles of ownership and control in intellectual
property rights systems adds important dimensions to assessing gray
marketing and potentially other intellectual property policies.
C. Sovereignty and PatentRights in a GlobalArena
The previous section indicated a deficiency in using the principle of
exhaustion to protect gray marketing. The principle is designed to limit the
control of the patent owner over the distribution of the patented item. But
in the context of gray markets, the principle does not protect gray markets
in the case where gray markets are the most desirable: gray markets that
cannot be controlled by the patent owner. The legality of gray markets can
be defended on the principle of exhaustion in many situations, but not in
scenarios presented by South Africa in which the source of the gray market
goods is another developing country where the goods are manufactured.
The issues raised by this structure of gray marketing raises questions of
sovereignty, particularly the ability of the state to fashion and refashion
patent rights.
Under TRIPS, signatory nations can limit or take intellectual property
rights through eminent domain in case ofnational emergency. South Africa,
while once considering declaring its AIDS epidemic a national emergency,
has declined to do so. While a state of emergency would have given the
government wide latitude in altering intellectual property rights, the
government still has the power to limit the exclusivity of patent rights.
Furthermore, the proposal for reimportation in the United States also
presents issues of violation of property rights and expropriation of the
rights of the patent owner. While in South Africa and in the United States
the patent owner would still have recognized patent rights, one stick in the
bundle (the exclusive right to distribute in the jurisdiction) has been taken
away.
The reimportation plans of both governments would most likely be
protected under Article 30 of TRIPS, which states: "Members may provide
limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent,'provided
that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal
exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of
third parties." 32 The key is determining what is an unreasonable conflict,
132. TRIPS, supra note 24, art. 30.
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a normal exploitation, an unreasonable prejudice, and what are legitimate
interests. Arguably, the creation of an alternative distribution channel for
the dissemination of a life-saving drug that allows the patent owner to
retain most of the rights granted under patent law, would meet the
standards of Article 30. It is important to point out that Article 30 permits
the government to alter patent rights without having to pay compensation.
The compensation requirement is expressed under Article 31, which applies
only when Article 30 does not (that is, when modifications of rights
unreasonably conflict with normal exploitation or unreasonably prejudice
a legitimate interest of the patent owner). 33 The South African and U.S.
Governments would have legal support for their position that creating a
gray market does not infringe on the rights of the pharmaceutical firms in
their patents.
The state strategy of creating gray markets creates two important issues
with which I will end my comments and leave for future debate. The issues
have to do with sovereignty and rights.134 As my economic analysis
described, patent owners will respond to gray markets and the response
may involve more transnational control over how patented items are
distributed and their sale price. Although national sovereigns can control
some of this activity (for example, by limits on transnational mergers),
sovereigns will have to coordinate their policies and activities to control the
responses to the gray market. While the battles may play out in legislative
politics (as they are in the United States), the real forum will be the
marketplace. What is troubling about the gray market policies is that the
hierarchy of politics and markets is reversed. Instead of sovereigns
regulating market activities, the market is created to resolve political
battles'. Within the marketplace, national governments and patent owners
(combined with manufacturers and retailers) are competing sovereigns that
determine claims of access and distribution. The competition among
sovereigns has become transparent as several pharmaceuticals in South
Africa have ceded their claims and now offer to provide drugs for free and
offer to develop infrastructure for delivery and access, activities deemed as
traditional sovereign functions.
What is even more troubling about the creation of gray markets as a
policy tool is that rights have seemingly vanished. Gray markets in
pharmaceuticals are used to protect rights without recognizing them.
Pragmatically, the distinction might not matter. If the goal is to provide
health care to the indigent and gray marketing does provide the necessary
133. Id. art. 31(h).
134. See Coombe, supranote 22, at 89 (commenting on the centrality of state sovereignty in
the human rights arena).
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access as presumed, then what difference does it make that the policy was
not based on an institutional recognition of rights?' But looking purely at
results and not means ignores certain values, such as a sovereign's
commitment to obligations, particularly the obligations to its citizens,
especially the most indigent.
Stressing my earlier point, this lack of commitment reinforces the ceding
of sovereignty. Even if the policies make some firms provide the drugs
more cheaply or for free or invest in infrastructure, the question remains
about what is the long-term benefit. In The Age of Access, commentator
Jeremy Rifkin laments that in the information age governed by intellectual
property law, fewer and fewer people actually own anything except for a
' Information, knowledge, and innovative products are not
right to access. 36
bought and sold, but licensed and loaned."3 Gray markets for
pharmaceuticals reinforce this type of society where rights of access are
granted to life-saving pharmaceuticals without recognizing a right to a
certain quality of life or standard of living. While, in the short run, gray
markets are beneficial and are, perhaps, even a practical and politically
available instrument in the long run, the appeal of gray markets should not
blind policy and law makers to commitments to institutions that protect and
respect individuals. 3 '

135. The point could be made that the policy of South Africa of promoting gray markets has
worked to lower prices. Several of the pharmaceutical firms doing business in South Africa,
relenting to political pressures and perhaps to the economic pressures from the gray market, have
agreed to lower the prices for AIDS drugs in South Africa. The question is whether these changes
are short or long-term and how they will change the system of health care delivery and access in
South Africa and other countries. See Carol Bellamy, How to DistributeAIDS Drugs,N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 26, 2001, at Al9.
136. JEREMY RIFKIN, THE AGE OF AccEss: THE NEW CULTURE OF HYPERCAPITALISM WHERE
ALL OF LIFE ISA PAID-FOR EXPERENCE 4-5 (2000).
137. The role of leasing in extending the market power of a monopolist has been studied
extensively by economists. The seminal article is written by R.H. Coase, Durability and
Monopoly, 15 J.L. & ECON. 143 (1972) (demonstrating why a monopolist selling durable goods
would prefer to lease rather than sell the good). See also John Shepard Wiley Jr. et al., The
Leasing Monopolist, 37 UCLA L. REV. 693,695-97 (1990) (discussing Coase's 1972 article and
its applications to antitrust law).
138. I have in mind here the conception of human rights that expressly recognizes power,
political relationships, and economic relationships, as opposed to the ethnocentric notion,
discussed by Professor Mutua. See Mutua, supra note 21, at 207 (critiquing the human rights
paradigm for ignoring power).
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V. SUMMARY

In two different jurisdictions, gray markets have been appealed to as a
way to protect interests that may be viewed solely as a matter of human
rights. In the United States, gray marketing was chosen largely out of
political feasibility. In South Africa, the solution was part of creating a
market for generic pharmaceuticals in conjunction with compulsory
licensing. In this Article, I have presented an economic analysis of gray
marketing and have demonstrated that its effectiveness rests on how the
patent owner responds to the creation of gray markets through his licensing
and corporate control practices. I conclude that the economic effect of gray
marketing will depend upon how the gray market is structured. Since the
United States and South African policies structure gray markets very
differently, the policies will have quite different effects, with greater
effectiveness in South Africa than in the United States.
While a large part of this Article has been devoted to the economics of
gray marketing, I conclude the Article by considering the legal issues
surrounding gray marketing, particularly the tension between economic and
human rights, the application of the principle of exhaustion, and the
question of vested rights and expropriation. There are strong legal
arguments to defend gray marketing, but the form of gray
marketing-uncontrolled or controlled-can be affected by the
interpretation of particular legal doctrines, specifically the principle of
exhaustion. I conclude that ultimately the question of gray marketing is one
of the scope of sovereignty in defining and altering intellectual property
rights, a scope that I contend is relatively broad under TRIPS. Gray
marketing, whether applied to pharmaceuticals or other industries, offers
a rich case study through which to understand sovereignty, intellectual
property policy, and the ownership and control structure imposed by
intellectual property law.
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